Questions in bold are more important than others. However, the actual exam questions will be a subset of any of these 90 questions sometimes combined into one questionanswerable within the regular class time. What is an argument?
The Problems of Personal Identity There is no single problem of personal identity, but rather a wide range of questions that are at best loosely connected. Here are the most familiar: The precise meaning of these phrases is hard to pin down. It may be, for instance, that being a philosopher and loving music belong to my identity, whereas being a man and living in Yorkshire do not.
Someone else could have the same four properties but feel differently towards them, so that being a man and living in Yorkshire belong to his identity but not being a philosopher or loving music. It contrasts with ethnic or national identity, which consists roughly of the ethnic group or nation one takes oneself to belong to and the importance one attaches to this.
Ludwig is a typical discussion of this topic. What is it to be a person? What is necessary, and what suffices, for something to count as a person, as opposed to a nonperson? The most common answer is that to be a person at a time is to have certain special mental properties then e.
Others propose a less direct connection between personhood and mental properties Chisholm What does it take for a person to persist from one time to another—to continue existing rather than cease to exist?
What determines which past or future being is you? What is it about the way she relates then to you as you are now that makes her you?
For that matter, what makes it the case that anyone at all who existed back then is you? This is sometimes called the question of personal identity over time. An answer to it is an account of our persistence conditions.
Imagine that after your death there really will be someone, in this world or the next, who resembles you in certain ways. How would that being have to relate to you as you are now in order to be you, rather than someone else?
What would the Higher Powers have to do to keep you in existence after your death? Or is there anything they could do? The answer to these questions depends on the answer to the persistence question. How do we find out who is who?
What evidence bears on the question of whether the person here now is the one who was here yesterday? One source of evidence is first-person memory: Another source is physical continuity: Which of these sources is more fundamental?
Does first-person memory count as evidence all by itself, for instance, or only insofar as we can check it against publicly available physical facts? What should we do when they support opposing verdicts? Ought we to conclude, on the basis of memory evidence, that the resulting person is not Charlie but Guy Fawkes brought back to life, or ought we instead to infer from the absence of physical continuity that he is simply Charlie with memory loss?
What principle would answer this question? The evidence question dominated the literature on personal identity from the s to the s good examples include Shoemakerand Penelhum It is important to distinguish it from the persistence question.
What it takes for you to persist through time is one thing; how we might find out whether you have is another. If the criminal had fingerprints just like yours, the courts may conclude that he is you. But even if that is conclusive evidence, having your fingerprints is not what it is for a past or future being to be you: If the persistence question asks which of the characters introduced at the beginning of a story have survived to become those at the end of it, we may also ask how many are on the stage at any one time.
What determines how many of us there are now? If there are some seven billion people on the earth at present, what facts—biological, psychological, or what have you—make that the right number? The question is not what causes there to be a certain number of people at a given time, but what there being that number consists in.
It is like asking what sort of configuration of pieces amounts to winning a game of chess, rather than what sorts of moves typically lead to winning.
But this is disputed.Mind-brain identity theory is something more than just the mind is the brain; So, each and every state of mind, is to be identified with, or is the very same thing as a state of the CNS. Mind brain theory says-there's something more than just that the mind is the brain, So each and every.
OTHER ITEMS OF INTEREST: The following sites contain information that may be of interest. Please bear in mind that the information at these sites is not controlled by the Center for An Accessible society. STUDY QUESTIONS for MIDTERM EXAM. (English version, or half-English half-Formalese version, is acceptable.) Is the argument presented formally valid?
That is, as a formal argument, do we have to accept the conclusion if we accept the premises as stated? Explain the Token-Token identity Theory.
Which version of the theory is stronger. Type physicalism (also known as reductive materialism, type identity theory, mind–brain identity theory and identity theory of mind) is a physicalist theory, in the philosophy of mind.
It asserts that mental events can be grouped into types, and can then be correlated with types of physical events in the brain. Functionalism is a view in the theory of the rutadeltambor.com states that mental states (beliefs, desires, being in pain, etc.) are constituted solely by their functional role – that is, they have causal relations to other mental states, numerous sensory inputs, and behavioral outputs.
Functionalism developed largely as an alternative to the identity theory of mind . Time. Time is what we use a clock to measure. Information about time tells us the durations of events, and when they occur, and which events happen before which others, so time has a very significant role in the universe's organization.